Using the tick-by-tick yen/dollar exchange rate, this paper examines exchange rate dynamics for the period of the 1997 Japanese banking crisis. By high-frequency methodology, GARCH estimation and varianceratio tests, the existence of a structural break in the foreign exchange market at the onset of the crisis is detected. We show a reversed pattern in return volatility after the series of bankruptcies. From the microstructure analysis, it is found that the change in exchange rate dynamics can be attributed to a change in strategic foreign exchange trade behavior.
Introduction
Many empirical investigations of high-frequency data, especially intraday exchange rate data, aim to shed light on market microstructure by focusing on spot rate revisions around some exogenous event. For example, the intraday return volatility pattern, such as the time of day eãect and news impact, are analyzed in Goodhart, Ito, and Payne (1996) , Peiers (1997) and Evans (2002) , to name a few. Other studies have examined the transmission eãect of volatility between markets: for example, Baillie and Bollerslev (1990) and Engle, Ito, and Lin (1990) examine a spillover eãect between diãerent market locations.
These studies rely on Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH)-type estimations and variance-ratio procedures. They unveil several features| for example, the impact of public announcements (e.g., regular news releases concerning macroeconomic fundamentals) on the foreign exchange (FX) market seems to be limited, while unexpected shocks have a greater and longer lasting eãect.
Based on the existence of asymmetry in the FX market at the high-frequency level, this paper further examines the impact of the Japanese banking crisis on the FX market for the sample period August{December 1997. 1 This series of bankruptcies was unprecedented, despite the fact that massive bad debts have been plaguing the banking system|Japan had previously experienced almost no bank failures, at least in recent years. 2 The series of bank closures triggered an acceleration in the speed of depreciation of the yen, which at the time was 1 In November 1997, two banks, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank (Japan's 10th largest bank)
and Tokuyo City Bank (a regional Japanese bank) went bankrupt|the former on November 17 and the latter on November 26. There were also two failures of Japanese brokerages:
Sanyo Securities (November 3) and Yamaichi Securities (November 24). Yamaichi was one of Japan's largest brokerages|the so-called Big Four. 2 The Japanese ånancial system, including the management of banks, had been implicitly guaranteed by the Ministry of Finance. In the past, as when Yamaichi faced bankruptcy in the mid-1960s, the government poured public money in to keep it on its feet. As the crisis became evident in the 1990s, the ministry closed some of the lowest quality institutions and created a bridge bank to receive the remaining assets of failed smaller institutions.
Some banks were encouraged to make large write-oãs, and the government closed nonbank subsidiaries of ånancial institutions specializing in housings loans, known as \jusen companies". For an overview of the Japanese ånancial system and the Japanese banking crisis in the 1990s, see Ito (1997, 2000) , Hoshi and Kashyap (2000) , Posen (2000) , and Sakakibara (2000) .
already on a downward trend, due to the changes in market participants' behavior in the FX market. By analyzing the tick-by-tick Japanese yen (JPY) to U.S. dollar (USD) exchange rate data, this paper estimates a signiåcant diãerence in the FX market microstructure after November 1997.
[ Figure 1 inserted here]
The evidence of the Japanese banking crisis in November 1997 is, for example, investigated from the viewpoint of the Japanese interbank market in Hayashi (2001) , indicating the presence of liquidity eãects before the Yamaichi Securities failure. There are however very few analyses of the eãect of the crisis on the FX market. At this time, Japanese ånancial institutions were persistently short of dollars, and of short-term funds in particular. The series of bankruptcies resulted in a dramatic loss of credibility for Japanese institutions in the eyes of the market, a situation which not only touched oãa depreciation of the yen, but also sparked an urgent demand for dollars on the part of dealers. The latter was in case of increased diéculty of borrowing in dollars, due to credit concerns held by the ånancial markets. The exchange rate, beginning at 115.85 yen against the dollar in August, exhibited continuous decline (depreciation of the yen), reaching 130.00 towards the end of the year, and 133.84
in early January 1998.
In testing the signiåcance diãerences of exchange rate dynamics across months, we follow Ito, Lyons and Melvin (1998) and Martens (2000) among others in estimating a GARCH model and calculating the conditional varianceratio. Thus, using the high-frequency methodology over the second half of 1997, we shed light on the impact of the Japanese banking crisis on the FX market. From the estimation results, it is shown that there exists a structural break in the foreign exchange market at the onset of the crisis; a reversed pattern in return volatility after the series of bankruptcies was found. Based on the assumption that dealers are perceived to be better informed about future changes in the exchange rate than some other agents, the sources of the reversed pattern are examined from a microstructure analysis of exchange rate trade behavior for the second half of 1997. We ånd that the change in exchange rate dynamics can be attributed to the change in strategic foreign exchange trade behavior. The result provides new insights into the trading activities of market makers at the onset of bank failures.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the Japanese banking crisis in historical perspective. Section 3 de-scribes the data used in this paper and brieçy summarizes the spot FX market trading structure. Section 4 presents the estimation methodology. Section 5 summarizes the results, and Section 6 examines their implications from the microstructure point of view. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Overview of the Japanese Banking Crisis in November 1997
Ever since the so-called \bubble economy" burst in 1990{92, Japan's economy has remained more or less stagnant. The stock market has been çat too, making it diécult for many ånancial institutions to generate proåts. There have been persistent fears that Japan's ånancial institutions have so many bad loans on their books that the whole Japanese ånancial system may collapse. Nationwide, private estimates of bad loans have ranged from around 10 percent to 20 percent of gross domestic product at their peak in 1995. 3 The Japanese government has been struggling, with limited success, to deal with its ånancial problems. 4 The closings of Sanyo securities, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, and Yamaichi Securities in November 1997 came as a signal that Japan's ånancial sector was deeply troubled. Under the weight of`hidden debt,' Yamaichi Securities, the fourth largest brokerage in Japan, was allowed to åle for bankruptcy|a signiåcant departure from the past.
The årst regional bank failure occurred in 1995 and was followed in 1996
by the oécially assisted restructurings, which organized mergers with other regional banks after providing capital injections. Service cut its rating of Yamaichi's debt to junk, making it harder and more expensive for Yamaichi to borrow and thereby roll over its debt. 6 According to the news source Bloomberg, the rejection of Sanyo's request was because the brokerage hadn't submitted a restructuring proposal and hadn't reported that the deadline needed to be postponed. 7 There was a series of news announcement that Bank of Japan would hold an emergency meeting on Yamaichi (6:00 (JST)) and that Yamaichi asked the Ministry of Finance to cease operations (7:39 (JST)). Before the formal closure on November 24, several Japanese media outlets had reported the conårmation of Yamaichi Securities' closure on November 23.
The exchange rate data used for the analysis in this paper is the tick-bytick JPY/USD spot rate for åve months, from August 1, 1997 to January 8, 1998, obtained from CQG. 8 The data set is unique in the sense that it is micro data|it provides information on trading between FX dealers around the world. Unlike the stock exchanges and securities markets, the FX market is virtually continuously active and traded in several diãerent locations on the globe. That is, the FX market is an electronic market active 24 hours a day with no particular geographical location; however, it is natural to think of the trading as proceeding according to time zones.
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Two features of the data used in this paper are particularly noteworthy.
First, it is micro data in that the exchange rates are tick-by-tick. It consists of the indicative bid-and asked-rates, and thereby provides the microstructure of the dealing as well as the FX market in depth. 10 Second, the analysis covers a relatively long time span of åve months, compared with other previous studies based on micro data sets. respectively. Since the original data set records every bid-and asked quote, it includes several \quote revisions"|either the bid or the asked price is successively quoted. These can be interpreted as the dealer's revision of prices in the midst of bid/ask oãer for whatever reason. The bids/asks in bold in Table 1, an extract of the CQG data set, are revised quotes.
[ Table 1 inserted here]
Although the CQG data has greater coverage and span, it does not provide information on the identity of the counterparties involved in each trade for conådentiality reasons. Our analysis below is based on the logarithmic middle price of the exchange rate, p t , which is deåned to be the log average of bid-and asked-prices, as in with the 10-minute interval price. The exchange rate return, r t , is given as Table 2 reports the summary statistics of r t (Ç100) for each month. The mean of the return is signiåcantly negative in September and October, implying that the Japanese yen showed a temporary recovery at that time, while the JPY/USD exchange rate tended to depreciate over the period as a whole.
Although the maximum and minimum values of the return, r t , vary across months, the monthly variance of the return does not show signiåcant change.
eãect. See Bollerslev and Domowitz (1993) for details of the weekend deånition. 13 Micro FX data sets such as Reuters, which very many previous studies have relied on, have limited access in providing information on individual parties participating in the market, the actual transaction prices, the size of trade, and so on. See Lyons (2001) for details.
[ Since the return is at 10 minute intervals, 12 lags and 24 lags correspond to 2 hours and 4 hours respectively. An exogenous shock is found to have a long-lasting eãect in the JPY/USD FX market.
Analysis Methodology
On the basis of the preliminary data analysis in the preceding section, the variance of the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model was estimated for each of the 10-minute årst diãerences of the logarithmic exchange rates. ånancial data that exhibit ARCH-type dynamics in the residuals, the GARCH model is commonly applied in estimation.
GARCH model
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In the presence of well-known characteristics of high-frequency returns such as volatility clustering, however, the GARCH estimate is likely to be biased:
GARCH assumes symmetry in volatility. As shown in the preliminary test in the previous section, the exchange rate used in the analysis has an asymmetry in its return. In order to obtain the consistent estimate, then, we apply an Exponential GARCH (EGARCH) model and a Threshold GARCH (TGARCH)
model by controlling the asymmetry in volatility. 16 The asymmetry is often referred to as the leverage eãect in the context of stock price returns.
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In the context of market eéciency, one explanation of the existence of volatility clustering is that diãerent investors either observe diãerent news or interpret the same news diãerently. Even though the market is eécient and the exchange rate follows a martingale process, if the information (news) comes as clustering, this could create as a result a process of price adjustment where the price bounces forth and back between centers with diãerent information:
the exchange rate follows an ARCH process.
The exchange rate return, r t , is speciåed as GARCH(1,1) as follows:
The error process, or the innovation, è t , is such that è t = h t z t , h t > 0. Here fz t g is a white-noise process with E(z t ) = 0 and Var(z t ) = 1, independent of all è tÄi , i ï 1. The conditional and unconditional means of è t are equal to 0.
As a result, the conditional variance of è t at time t, h 2 t , is normally distributed with zero mean. That is,
The dependent variable in the EGARCH model is the logarithm of volatility, in order to maintain nonnegativity of volatility. The conditional variance h 2 t in EGARCH speciåcations takes the form
Note that the left hand side of this equation is the log of the conditional variance. This means that the asymmetric (leverage) eãect is exponential and therefore the forecasts of conditional variance are nonnegative.
16 See Nelson (1991) for EGARCH and Rabemananjara and Zakoian (1993) for TGARCH. 17 The commonly observed fact that a negative return in the previous period has a larger eãect on the current stock price than a positive return does is often called the \leverage
The asymmetric eãect is described as parameter íin the EGARCH model.
This eãect implies commonly observed evidence of asymmetry in stock price behavior; negative surprises (è t < 0) tend to decrease the rate of return r t and to increase the volatility more than the positive surprises (è t > 0). In the EGARCH speciåcation íallows this eãect to be asymmetric. If í= 0, then a positive surprise has the same eãect on volatility as a negative surprise of the same magnitude. If Ä1 < í< 0, a positive surprise increases volatility less than a negative surprise. If í< Ä1, a positive surprise actually reduces volatility while a negative surprise increases volatility. Therefore, í6 = 0 corresponds to asymmetry in the volatility.
In applying EGARCH estimation to the exchange rate model, the interpretation of írequires caution. In the EGARCH system, a negative shock (è t < 0)
to reduce the \numeric" exchange rate return, r t , is equivalent to appreciation of the yen vis-a-vis the dollar, while a positive shock (è t > 0) is equivalent to depreciation of the yen. Therefore, an estimated value í 6 = 0 is interpreted as an appreciation shock increasing volatility more than a depreciation shock, and vice versa.
Similar to the idea behind the EGARCH speciåcation, the TGARCH model also assumes an asymmetric impact on volatility. The conditional variance in the TGARCH speciåcation takes the form
where d t = 1 if è t < 0, and 0 otherwise.
Asymmetry is captured by parameter ç in the TGARCH model. In this speciåcation, good news (positive surprises, è t > 0) has an impact of å 1 on volatility while bad news (negative surprises, è t < 0) has impact å 1 + ç. If ç= 0, there exists no asymmetric impact between the two. If 0 < ç, bad news has a larger eãect on volatility than good news does. Again, the interpretation of ç requires caution. In the TGARCH system, a depreciation shock (è t > 0) has impact å 1 on volatility, while an appreciation shock (è t < 0) has impact
Variance Ratio Test
Based on GARCH estimation, we conduct a month-to-month variance-ratio test. Variance-ratio statistics are routinely employed in empirical work to assess the structural change in high-frequency returns over time. In testing the diãerence of return volatility over a speciåc interval, a test for equality of variances is conducted. The null hypothesis of no diãerence is stated in terms of the variance-ratio as V 1 V 2 = 1; where V 1 and V 2 denote the return variance for the two sample groups, respectively. If the returns are i.i.d. normally distributed and the null hypothesis is valid, the variance-ratio represents a realization of an F n 1 ;n 2 -distributed random variable, where n 1 and n 2 are the number of observations. When the sample size is large enough, the F-distribution is approximately normal. The associated F value of the conditional variance ratio for the two sub-samples is calculated as
where S 
Results
First, the EGARCH and TGARCH estimations are conducted for August 1, 1997{January 8, 1998 . 18 Based on the monthly estimation results, the existence of asymmetry in return volatility is examined. Next, the variance-ratio test is employed to test whether there is a signiåcant diãerence in the behavior of the exchange rate across months.
[ Table 3 inserted here]
The estimates of volatility asymmetry are presented in Table 3 . In the table, íand çshow the asymmetric impact for EGARCH(1,1) and TGARCH (1,1) respectively. Estimated í is signiåcantly negative during August{October, while signiåcantly positive in December, and insigniåcant in November, implying the existence of asymmetry in volatility in August-October, but insigniåcant impact in November and December. Estimated ç gives the same implication: estimated parameters are signiåcantly positive during August{ October, while signiåcantly negative in November and December. In sum, return volatility in the JPY/USD FX market shows the usual clustering and asymmetry before the crisis. However, it behaves \exceptionally" after November 1997. This result can potentially be attributed to change in dealer behavior: in the wake of bank failures, traders became cautious in terms of their response to news, including issues related to the banking systems.
[ Table 4 inserted here]
The month-to-month variance-ratio test results are summarized in Table 4 .
The associated F value of the conditional variance ratio for the two sub-samples is calculated based on the results of EGARCH (1,1) The GARCH estimation and the variance-ratio results provide strong evidence that the banking crisis did indeed change the behavior of exchange rate volatility. In contrast to the \normally" observed asymmetric news impact on high-frequency return for the pre-crisis period, the post-crisis return showed no time-varying conditional volatility or non-normally distributed residual.
Inferences are that the increasing diéculty in forecasting the exchange rate prices in the wake of the bank failures led dealers to quote in a wider range of prices. Also, they were more likely to revise the price of the yen down. These results support the hypothesis that bank failures in November 1997 dramatically changed FX market dealers' behavior.
Microstructure of FX market
As shown in the previous section, we ånd a reversed volatility pattern at the onset of the banking crisis. The change in the exchange rate dynamics was due to a change in trading patterns following an extreme event: the bankruptcy of three major Japanese ånancial institutions within one month.
In this section, we investigate exchange rate trading in detail over the period|the microstructure of the spot FX market for the period around the Japanese banking crisis of November 1997. Speciåcally, by examining the trade activity of exchange rates through frequency of quote revision and width of price change, we identify a change in FX trade patterns after the crisis. The results provide new insights into the trading activities of market makers at the onset of bank failures.
Quote Entry
First, we examine the frequency of quote entry. Table 5 [ Table 5 inserted here]
On the whole, the diãerence in frequency sample average between bids and asks is not particularly large at each time interval. The frequency of quote entry is extremely large, approximately 930 instances, when both the European and US markets are active, which is 16:00 to 24:00 (JST). Quote entry decreases a little, but the market is still active and the frequency exceeds 570, between 0:00 and 4:00 (JST). In the period after the US market closes and before the Tokyo market opens|4:00 to 8:00 (JST)|trading activity is relatively small and calm.
The frequency of both the bid-and asked-quote entry increased after the onset of the banking crisis between 20:00 and 8:00 (JST). In particular, the frequency almost doubled between 4:00 and 8:00 (JST), when the exchange rate is usually least active (between the New York market closure and Tokyo market opening). The averaged frequency of bid quotes at this time increased dramatically, from 122 before the crisis to 204 after the crisis. There was also a large increase in frequency between 0:00 and 4:00 (JST), the US trading time, from 461{470 instances to 728{735 instances. On the other hand, the frequency decreased between 8:00 and 20:00 (JST), which is the Asian trading time. For example, the frequency of bid quotes from 12:00 to 16:00 (JST), when the Tokyo market was at its most active time, decreased from 498 before the crisis to 412 after the crisis. It is apparent from the table that in the wake of Japan's banking crisis, FX trading activity became less active during the Asian trading time, including at Tokyo|one of the three major markets. Table 6 shows the hourly average of frequency of quote revision and the associated absolute price change. In the table, \positive" price change is quotes revised on depreciation of the yen, while \negative" change is those on appreciation of the yen. For each time interval, the frequency and the price change of both bids and asks for the sample period from August to October, from
Quote Revision and Price Change
November to December, and the sample average are shown.
[ Table 6 inserted here]
Regarding quote revision, the frequency sample average varies across the As a whole, the width of price change is larger as the market is more active.
Comparing the price changes before and after the crisis, price width for both bids and asks changes become larger between 8:00 and 19:59 (JST) after the crisis. For example, the bid rate width with positive price change before the crisis was 0.0403, compared to 0.433 after, for the period from 8:00 to 11:59. In particular, from 8:00 to 15:59 when the Tokyo market was the most active, the price change of bids was wider than that of asks. Between 12:00 and 15:59, the bid rate width for positive price change widened from 0.0389 to 0.0481, and the bid rate width for negative price change also widened from 00418 to 0.0527. This fact reçects dealers' urgent demand for dollars with the series of bankruptcies. The majority of Tokyo market participants are Japanese ånancial and non-ånancial institutions, which were heavily in need of US dollars, and therefore likely to raise the buying price of US dollars in order to procure them.
In contrast, for the time intervals from 20:00 to 3:59 (JST), during opening of the European and US markets, price change with only ask rate revision become larger after the crisis. It is also noteworthy that the width of ask price change is larger than that of bids during this time interval. The majority of participants at these time intervals are US and European banks and other institutions, which provide, rather than buy, dollars. Thus, the value of the dollar rose in response to increased demand from Japanese banks and institutions.
In sum, the trading patterns, including frequency of quote entry and quote revisions, show marked changes at the onset of the banking crisis. The frequency of quote entry indicates that the Tokyo market became less active after the bank failures. Although the frequency of quote revisions remained relatively stable compared to the pre-crisis period, the width of price change associated with quote revision widened after its onset. In particular, the bids price change became larger during Tokyo trading time, whereas the asks price change became larger during the European and US market trading times. This is consistent with the fact that in the wake of the crisis, Japanese ånancial and non-ånancial institutions were heavily in need of dollars. The buying price of dollars therefore soared when Japanese årms are active in market, while the selling price of dollars rose when dealers in Europe and the US were active.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we apply GARCH estimation and the variance-ratio test to the tick-by-tick quoted JPY/USD exchange rate data and reveal several interesting 
